This chapter focuses on a very particular aspect of the democratic reform of police forces that took place in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts.
2 out, 'it reminds us that in the final analysis the client of state security institutions is the individual citizen'.
ii Civil society performs this role through three types of actions. First, it can be the source of information and knowledge on security and defence matters for both the public and policymakers and, thereby, can contribute to the shaping, implementation and acceptance of policies. Second, it can promote and facilitate wider participation in the process through public debate on security and defence matters (newspaper reporting, public meetings and so on), which also contributes to the development of reforms that are locally owned and locally sustainable. Third, civil society can hold security actors accountable for wrongdoing and malpractice by performing an external oversight role.
iii It is this third type of action that best describes what was achieved by the two Associations of Decertified Policemen. In Bosnia this oversight was directed at both the Bosnian authorities and the UN, whose extensive powers drove the process of certification of police officers. Thus, the case study in this chapter sheds light on the ability of civil society in protectorate-style contexts to 'guard the The chapter begins with an overview of civil society developments in post-conflict Bosnia. The assessment focuses on Bosnian Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), reflecting the tendency in the majority of the literature to centre on this category when discussing civil society more generally.
vi However, the author understands civil society as a much wider concept encompassing other types of non-state actors that, as explained in the Introduction to this edited volume, shape political change through social activism. The two Associations of Decertified Policemen are not a typical example of civil society associations if we take into account that their members are private citizens who until 3 decertification were part of a key institution in the state administration. Moreover, they were assisted at various points in their political and legal campaigning by police trade unions. However, exploring the social activism of these two associations contributes to the existing literature on civil society activism in Bosnia, and in post-conflict scenarios more generally, by focusing on a non-NGO example where the outcomes of the process speak directly to the roles that have been associated with civil society promotion in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Moreover, due to the background of the members of these associations -as noted above -this case study allows us to reflect on what has been described, in the Introduction to this edited volume, as the blurred boundaries between state and society, public and private in post-conflict reconstruction efforts. The chapter also provides a brief overview of the certification process (goals, rationale, modus operandi) with particular attention to the operational, but more importantly the structural problems used by the two associations as arguments has prompted accusations that the social contract between Bosnian citizens and the nascent postconflict state has been undermined. Two reasons are given. Firstly, the 'siphoning' off valuable personnel attracted by the higher salaries and better working conditions in the NGO sector and, secondly, the 'appropriation' of key services and functions normally associated with the state (or market). failing to respond to incidents of violence, intimidation and/or discrimination involving citizens from another ethnic group, or even perpetrating such acts. xxvii There was also an economic rationale. In the aftermath of the war there were too many police officers. Some downsizing was required to achieve reasonable numbers that would be more representative of police-population ratios and financially sustainable over the long term for an impoverished Bosnian state. There are still instances, even at the time of writing, of police officers investigated, arrested and/or prosecuted for war crimes and other crimes committed in the period prior to the police certification process.
Of course, given the sheer numbers of officers to be inspected (44,000 according to the UN) and difficulties during the data gathering stages, the certification process was bound to be a very complex endeavour, with room for misjudgements and error. There were also a number of operational difficulties that added to the already complex nature of the process, including lack of preparation of some IPTF officers for the investigative tasks, and under-utilisation of domestic (including civil society) actors in the data gathering stages. To this can be added the attempted politicisation of the process by local authorities, who used it sometimes to wage war against opposing political factions.
However, the main source of contention surrounding the certification process is related to its structural shortcomings, which contravened the spirit and the letter of the UNMIBH/IPTF´s assignment in Bosnia. Some police officers were decertified without explanation and unaware that they had been/were being investigated, or were denied the opportunity to appeal against the UNMIBH/IPTF charges (see below), or were in limbo with appeals unanswered when the UN mission departed. There were even more problematic cases of police officers that 'fell in the middle [...] did not show up in any list'. xxxiii In other words, their names were not on the list of certified officers issued by the UNMIBH/IPTF to the police authorities, but they also had not received a notice of decertification. Because the certification process was not based on a Bosnian legal mechanism, but relied on UN Chapter VII authorisation, it was unclear how Bosnian law enforcement authorities should deal with this category of police officers, which left the final decision to their discretion. vetting of the police and prison services, the army and the judiciary, such as was carried out with UN assistance, should include elements that would distinguish the processes from 'wholesale purges'.
These 'official' vettings should include notification of the allegations against the parties under investigation with 'reasonable notice', provision of an opportunity to respond to or appeal against the allegations before the body carrying out the vetting process, and 'the right to appeal an adverse decision' in front of a court or any other independent body. xxxix Also, drawing on lessons learnt from previous missions, this UN report highlighted that legitimate vetting processes must be respectful of the 'sensitivities of victims and of the human rights of those suspected of abuses'. xl These UN guidelines were issued over one and a half years after the end of the police certification process in 
CONCLUSION
It cannot be denied that the certification process was a much needed reform in post-Dayton Bosnia given the role of the police forces during the war and in the immediate post-settlement phases. lx At the same time, the use of non-democratic means to achieve democratic progress within the institution of the police brought into play a number of 'disturbing dynamics' -to quote Marcus Cox -that were used by the two Associations of Decertified Policemen to mobilise legally and politically. lxi From a civil society point of view, the Associations of Decertified Policemen are a case study with important lessons, even if the material interests that motivated their actions were very narrow in scope. These associations are a good example of the role that civil society activism can play as a form of external oversight to ensure transparency and accountability from decision makers, whether national or international, when wrongdoing is committed in the design and implementation of top-down policies.
It illustrates also that despite the short-termism, 'projectmania' lxii and service-orientation that seems to have predominated among NGOs in Bosnia, there is room for more engaged civil society actors in pursuit of inclusive and legitimate democratic reforms. At the same time, the fact that these associations were in some respects substituting for the state in defending the rights of a specific group of Bosnian citizens reveals 'uncomfortable truths' about the complexity of statebuilding in a context of a strong international presence and power, and weak local institutions. Describing the situation as a choice between 'human rights or the wishes of international bureaucrats' lxiii may be an exaggerated description of the situation, but it does capture the dilemma during the certification process. The
Bosnian state had a duty to respond to the needs of these citizens, but its exercise of that duty was 
